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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Toni Morrison’s novels are always political1. Morrison’s seventh novel, Paradise, 
published in 1997, is no different. Jami L. Carlacio maintains that Morrison’s work has been 
an ongoing commitment to redefine (African American) personhood with the intention of 
ultimately producing a new consciousness regarding race (xv). Beyond race consciousness, 
Morrison’s writing is indeed “a catalyst, a vibrant intellectual site, for interrogating some of 
the most pressing concerns and contradictions of our world today” (Peterson 261-2). In 
Playing in the Dark (1992) Morrison discredits the view that “canonical American literature 
is free of, uninformed, and unshaped by the four-hundred-year-old presence of, first, Africans 
and then African Americans in the United States” (5). Morrison then makes visible the 
invisible Africanist2 presence in literature of the United States. Morrison argues that since the 
literature she analyzes was not written by or for African Americans “the fabrication of an 
Africanist persona is reflexive; an extraordinary meditation on the self; a powerful 
exploration of the fears and desires that reside in the [white] writerly conscious” (16-17). 
While Paradise addresses specific issues of race, gender, and history, this thesis argues that a 
close reading of the text reveals Morrison making visible the invisible presence of the other 
in the formation of the self. 
                                                        1 In an interview with Alice Childress, who quotes the Black Arts Movement assertion that “art equals politics… and [that] art must serve some political and some consciousness‐raising end,” Morrison responds, “I think all good art has always been political. None of the best writing, the best thoughts have been anything other than that” (3). In “Rootedness” Morrison asserts that unless her work is political it is about nothing (64). Also see Jill Matus (1998) for the shared concerns in Paradise and Morrison’s earlier novels. 2 Morrison explains her use of the term “Africanism” as follows: “[Rather] I use it as a term for the denotative and connotative blackness that African peoples have come to signify, as well as the entire range of views, assumptions, readings, and misreadings that accompany Eurocentric learning about these people” (“Playing in the Dark” 6‐7). 
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Since her very first novel The Bluest Eye (1971), Morrison has dealt with the 
complexity of African American identity in relation to its historical and social context. As 
such Morrison’s work has been a continual deconstruction of the African American identity 
as other. However, when, in Paradise, African Americans embody the same discriminatory 
values as the dominant culture, Morrison in effect seems to be deconstructing3 human 
identity itself - thus addressing the universal individual. Moreover, Mae G. Henderson points 
out that the process of constructing identity, rather than discovering identity, is central to 
Morrison’s artistic vision (Davidson 363). Paradise will similarly portray the constructed 
nature of human identity. 
Paradise nonetheless functions to re-member the historical past for both African 
Americans and America as a whole (Davidson 355). Comparing Paradise to Beloved and 
Jazz, Davidson is correct to argue that the latter two depict the role of narrative in the 
reconstitution process of the individual while Paradise assesses the role of narrative in the 
community (355-6). Similarly, Patricia Storace is correct to observe that Paradise evokes 
images of the white founding fathers of the United States, making Paradise a provocative 
allegory of nationhood (Davidson 371). 
Paradise tells the story of the lives and interactions between residents of an all-black 
town, Ruby, and its neighbors, a group of women who live outside of town in what is known 
as the “Convent.”  Patricia Best, the town’s self-appointed historian, describes the beautiful, 
tall, and graceful people of Ruby as eight-rocks (8-R), because of the blue-black color of 
their skin that resembles “a deep level in the coal mines” (193). While Paradise captures the                                                         3 The notion of “deconstructing human identity” refers to exposing the paradox of the self not being self‐identical and “unrelated” to other people whom it perceives as very unlike itself. Deconstruction usually reveals how that which was considered as other or peripheral is often at the center of the self.  
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shift from the civil rights movement to the post-civil rights era in which the realities of racial 
integration and gender equality as “putative paradises” were first being examined (Schur 
277), this thesis argues that Morrison simultaneously builds a case for the possibility of a 
deeper shift that could lead to a redefinition of all human-to-human relations. Thus, despite 
Paradise’s clear historical and communal import, this thesis will focus on the timeless 
significance inherent in it by which Morrison addresses the universal individual. 
This universal individual resonates with Philip Page’s assertion (648) that the open-
endedness of Paradise, especially the ending, is Morrison’s invitation to the reader to join 
her in "shouldering the endless work [we] were created to do down here in paradise" (318). 
The scope of consciousness-raising enabled through Paradise reaches beyond race or gender 
to all human-to-human relations. 
The key focus in my analysis will be an exploration of the themes of doubles, twins, and 
mirrors found in Paradise, for these lend themselves to a striking interpretation. Analyzing 
these themes through the lenses of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan, one discerns that in Paradise the individual’s identity is in fact split and not 
the assumed stable self of rationality. Paradise argues for more than the necessity of 
communities to be open to diversity; it presents a case in which the self is the twin of every 
“other.”  
I begin by defending my focus on doubleness, thereafter I discuss relevant aspects of 
Lacan and Levinas, and then analyze identity construction in detail. 
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CHAPTER 2. DEFENDING AND HIGHLIGHTING DOUBLENESS4 
Earlier Morrison novels abound in pairs of characters placed in parallel destinies 
(Harding & Martin 40). Harding and Martin mention that the double is portrayed as a mirror 
reflection in the case of Milkman and Guitar, Song of Solomon (1977); as spiritual bonding 
between Nel and Sula, Sula (1974); and as social a substitute, played by Beloved, Beloved 
(1987) (42). To these examples can be added the later novel, Love (2003) and the characters 
of Heed and Christine. In contrast to these examples, Paradise does not limit doubleness to 
one or two primary characters in the novel. In Paradise doubleness functions as a guiding 
metaphor. 
The profusion of doubleness is almost uncanny; it seems to want to “resolve” a 
troublesome matter.5 This resolve would take the form of exposing the “troublesome matter” 
as being the fact that identity-as-interdependent has always been suppressed. The generally 
accepted view of identity as singular and independent, which justifies self-righteousness and 
wars of intolerant discrimination, would then have to be discarded.  
The fact that Morrison initially titled this novel, filled with doubleness, “War” suggests 
that doubleness is a specific meditation6 with which she is responding to problems that result 
from a blindness to the legitimacy of otherness. The profusion of doubles functions to 
underscore that deciphering its meaning in the text is vital – whether in relation to the theme 
of war, or not.                                                          4 I use the term “doubleness” instead of doubles, because doubles suggest two of the same kind, while doubleness suggests “plurality in two” or “one and another,” which in effect can be “one and many others.” 5 Freud’s notion of the uncanny marks the constant repetition of the repressed, which continually returns in an effort to be resolved (Freud 947). 6 In an interview with Elizabeth Farnsworth, Morrison reveals that her pondering certain issues in 
Paradise took the form of a “meditation, if you will, and interrogation” of these ideas (156). 
  
5 
At times the mention of doubleness seems superfluous, as when Lone’s gum – 
Doublemint – is mentioned three times (12, 276, 289) or when the cars belonging to the 
strangers who thought they could harass Ruby girls are described as having “double 
molding” and “two-speed automatic transmission” (12). In a novel not as clearly marked by 
doubles, these arbitrary descriptions would have gone unnoticed. In Paradise they however 
emphasize the already incessant theme, which demands to be interpreted. 
Paradise is indeed a proliferation of literal twins, figurative twins, twin situations, and 
twin histories. The double is a mirror figure, which is ultimately not limited to the numerical 
two, but instead conveys the idea of a self and an other, thus a self and all others. The double 
figure thus functions to disrupt the idea of singularity in identity by making otherness part of 
the self. Existentially, such a position challenges either/ or dichotomies and essentialist 
paradigms. Harding and Martin argue that Morrison’s use of the double is not that of an anti-
self or imperfect self, but instead Morrison’s double enables the creation of identity in 
tension with an other to reveal an “interactional” identity of unity in multiplicity (41).  
Three sets of twins include Deacon (Deek) and Steward, their grandfather and his twin 
brother, and Mavis’s dead twin babies. Two sets of two brothers are killed in Vietnam: 
Mavis’s two brothers and Deek’s only two sons. Two sisters, Soane and Dovey, are married 
to two brothers, Deek and Steward. The town’s founding fathers include Big Papa and Big 
Daddy, Old Fathers and New Fathers. The symbolism of double sets of human relations 
seems to suggest completeness in difference. 
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Twin histories are presented in the stories of Haven and Ruby, but also metaphorically in 
the history of Paradise as a history of the United States. The foundings of both towns are 
also marked by what they call a “Disallowing.”7 
The splitting into two of what is really a unity is further reflected in Connie’s insistence 
that the body and spirit should not be separated or the one valued as more important than the 
other (263).  
Paradise further confronts the reader with otherness of a spiritual and intellectual nature. 
Two opposing preachers, and two versions of God, one cross with a Christ figure and another 
without, challenge the reader’s own position on these matters. As with previous novels, 
Paradise shifts between the natural realm and a mystical realm of ghosts, mythical figures, as 
well as characters that are difficult to place in either realm.  
I will restrict my analysis to explorations of doubleness as it concerns human-to-human 
identity formation8.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        7 See Paradise, p. 194. 8 While both Levinas and Lacan deal with notions of the unknowable as it informs the self’s identity, I will refrain from exploring the interplay between the spiritual and the supernatural. For this reason, despite its potential to strengthen my thesis, I will not examine the Convent women’s personal healing, which involves spiritual aspects as well as explicitly shared identities. The doubleness theme is strongly portrayed in this healing process as the women’s healing is predominantly enabled through their overlapping identities, depicted by “the dreamer’s tale” that is shared by all of them. The doubleness is even made explicit in the notion of the women transferring their pain onto images drawn of themselves – as when Morrison writes that Seneca “duplicated” one of her scars onto the drawn image of herself instead of cutting her physical body (264, 265).   
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CHAPTER 3. LACAN AND LEVINAS 
3.1 Introduction 
One aspect, among many, which Morrison, Lacan, and Levinas have in common, is 
that they are performative writers who deal with complex issues, making their work 
notoriously difficult to understand. Each intentionally requires the reader to work to piece 
together meaning. The reason may be that each in his or her own way argues that 
meaningfulness is not limited to the knowable. As already mentioned though, I will refrain 
from exploring the “in-between” spaces (Morrison), the primordial relation (Levinas), and 
the impossibility of the “I” recognizing itself (Lacan). While such explorations would 
provide a stronger foundation for the necessary move away from narrow-minded definitions 
of identity, it is a topic for a bigger project. 
Levinas and Lacan, twentieth century giants in their respective disciplines of 
philosophy and psychoanalysis, lived and wrote in the same city, at the same time, among the 
same colleagues, often using the same language and the same sources and yet they never 
addressed each other’s work (Marcus 32). But they dealt with many of the same issues, 
including the structure of subjectivity, the function of alterity, and the nature of ethics. For 
the purposes of this thesis, the highest concern for me is the fact that, for both Levinas and 
Lacan, the self is fundamentally created on the basis of “the intervention of the other”9 
(Marcus 31).  
By using Levinas and Lacan, I am not trying to psychoanalyze Morrison or characters 
in Paradise, nor am I trying to find the true master narrative about the human condition or 
                                                        9 See David Ross Fryer’s The Intervention of the Other: Ethical Subjectivity in Levinas and Lacan.   
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subjectivity. This essay is also not to compare Levinas and Lacan’s work, but to use their 
theories to crystallize something Morrison is saying. While Lacan argues that the subject’s 
identity is fundamentally based on the other and Levinas argues that the self’s identity is for 
the other, Morrison shows that identity is both based on the other and is for the other. 
 
3.2 Lacan: The Mirror Phase 
Lacan described his work as a radical rereading of Freud (Leitch et al. 1278-9). This 
re-interpretation and development was largely influenced by his following literary and 
philosophical developments of the period, which included developments in linguistics, 
especially the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jacobson; developments in social 
anthropology, in particular Claude Levi-Strauss’s work; Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
master-slave dialectic; as well as the influence of surrealism in his thinking (ibid 1279, 
Stavrakakis 18-19). Lacan’s major breakthrough, ascribed to his recognition that the 
unconscious is structured like a language (Grigg xi, Haute 3), where the signifier and the 
signified never meet, enabled him to argue that the subject’s identity can never be self-
identical. For this reason the concept of “otherness” is central to Lacan’s thinking, since, as 
Saussure demonstrated, the meaning of a word is always deferred as it can never be found in 
the word itself, but only through its relation witht other words (972).  
Lacan introduces a conception of subjectivity constituted by a radical lacking, which 
he traces back to the Freudian idea of Spaltung (splitting) (Stavrakakis 22). Lacan further 
explains this split through his notion of the mirror phase, which marks a specific period in the 
child’s development, but is nonetheless also a permanent structure of subjectivity.  
  
9 
The fundamental lack of the split subject causes it to necessarily identify with socially 
available objects of identification such as other people, political ideologies, patterns of 
consumption, and social roles (Stavrakakis 23). For Lacan this identification with otherness 
happens in the psyche. Lacan explains the psyche’s structuring of human experience as 
functioning in a system of interacting realms, which he calls the Real, Symbolic, and 
Imaginary10 (Bailly 88, Stavrakakis 23).  
During his formulations of the Imaginary and the Symbolic it became evident for 
Lacan that there was something that could not be captured by the signifier and thus always 
remained “left out” (Bailly 98). That which is “left out” appears to be of the Real. The Real is 
that aspect of the signifier that remains imperceptible and unsymbolised and yet it is that 
which distorts and dislocates imaginary and symbolic representations and identifications 
(Bailly 98, Stavrakakis 20). Although the resources available to the lacking subject are 
imaginary and symbolic, both these planes are ultimately unable to provide anything 
resembling a full identity, because of their inability to master the always escaping Real 
(Stavrakakis 23). Thus, while there would be a great deal to discover in analyzing the in-
between and inexplicable spaces encountered in Paradise at the hand of Lacan’s Real, which 
is itself described as the in-between that shapes reality while not being part of reality (Parker 
129), I will limit my focus to the Imaginary and Symbolic orders.  
In Lacan’s early work he saw the “mirror stage”11 as belonging to a specific moment 
of transformation in the intellectual development of the child  (“Ecrits” 76). In his later work, 
such as the fourth Seminar, Lacan argues that "the mirror stage extends beyond an instance in                                                         10 I capitalize the Imaginary, Symbolic, and the Real to distinguish them from their ordinary meanings. 11 Lacan borrows the term “mirror stage” from Henri Wallon, although he never acknowledges this (Roudinesco 27). 
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the development of the child; it represents a permanent structure of subjectivity in which the 
subject is permanently caught and captivated by its own image,” albeit as reflected by 
otherness.  
Prior to the mirror stage the child had no sense of itself as a unitary being, having 
experienced only fragments of itself (Bailly 29). The first time the child thinks of itself as “I” 
is when it sees itself in a mirror during the ages of 6-18 months and recognizes the image as 
its own image representing itself (“Ecrits” 76, Bailly 29). At this point an intellectual 
relationship of the Subject’s internal world and the external world ensues which is the 
beginning of consciousness of self (“Ecrits” 78, Bailley 31-32). 
 It is however not itself the child identifies with, but an imago, or image of itself. For 
this reason it is not the “I” that is established in this moment, but what Lacan calls the Ideal-I 
of the ego (Lacan 76). This founding act of identity is therefore really an identification with 
an “other” that is separated from the self (Bailly 30). From the beginning, the child/ subject’s 
identity is thus both “what I am” and “what others and I see of me” – the image is oneself 
and simultaneously not oneself (Bailly 31). While this aspect of the mirror stage occurs in the 
realm of the Imaginary12 the mental process of translating the mirror image into a concept of 
“self” is also the beginning of the submission of the subjective self to processes of 
symbolization (Bailley 31-32, “Ecrits,” Lacan 78).  
It should be noted that prior to this submission to symbolization, the child is always 
already caught up within the symbolic. Lacan argues that while the image – as experienced in 
the Imaginary order - plays an important structuring role in identity formation, “this role is                                                         12 The Imaginary is named for the mental process that issue from the encounter between the infant and its 
image in the mirror. The Imaginary is the psychic realm where the child experiences the idea of a "self" in the 
face of a mirror image. The mirror stage cements a self/other dichotomy (Bailly 37).  
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completely taken up and caught up within, remolded and reanimated by the symbolic order” 
(“The Psychoses” 9). The fact that the child is always already caught up in the symbolic is 
demonstrated by the fact that the child already exists in the speech of its family even before 
its birth. From birth onwards the language of its society and family will further shape the 
child (Fink 36). At the same time, before the intellectual recognition that occurs between 6-
18 months the child’s first mirror is truly the gaze of the mother or primary caregiver  (Bailly 
37). 
Lacan thus posits the subject as coming into being by means of its relationship with 
otherness. As is evident however, “otherness” takes on two forms. In 1955, Lacan made a 
distinction between the small other and the capitalized Other. The small other derives from 
the mirror stage. As we have seen, it is not a real “other” but the reflection and projection of 
the ego. As such, it belongs to the realm of the Imaginary. Apart from the small other in the 
mirror, the individual comes to recognize all other people as “little others,” and to treat them 
as suitable objects of projection and identification that the self may want to emulate (Bailly 
65).  
On the other hand, the capitalized Other indicates a radical otherness which is beyond 
the Imaginary (Bailly 66). This Other belongs to the Symbolic,13 which encompasses social 
structures, values, laws, and language and operates as the laws of the unconscious 
organization of human society (Bailly 66, 94, Leitch et al. 1281). The Symbolic order thus 
allows the internalization of mirror images, which allows the ego to form as a sedimentation 
of ideal images (Fink 36). These images should be understood as being in interplay between                                                         13 Lacan took the term “Symbolic” from social anthropology, which revealed that even the most “primitive” 
societies function through various symbolic orders such as societal rules, taboos, mores and expectations, amongst others that regulate relations in society (Bailly 71).  
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the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders. Other people, for example the mother, can thus be 
both a small other and a big Other – on the one hand as someone to emulate or as someone 
presenting values. Ultimately, “the subject is constituted in and through the encounter with 
an Other” (Haute 71). 
Paradise presents the reader with numerous instances of characters whose identity is 
portrayed as dominated by otherness – be it the projections or reflections of identities, views, 
commands, prohibitions, and even rejections of other characters. Whereas the citizens of 
Ruby lived in an isolated world, Morrison shows the impossibility and dangers of assumed 
“self-identical” identity.  
 
3.3 Levinas: Totality and Infinity 
As Morrison dedicated Beloved to the 60 million and more who died in the Middle 
Passage and those who survived it, so too Levinas dedicated his work to the victims of the 
Holocaust.14 Both Morrison and Levinas have dedicated their work to address the issue of 
totalizing the other person, in other words, reducing him or her to the self’s thinking. 
Levinas’s writing is an attempt to “reverse the deadly logic” of Western thinking (Saphiro 
759-60).  
The core of Levinas’s position can be found in two of his major works, Totality and 
Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1969) and Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence 
(1974). Totality and Infinity is firstly a critique of totalizing thinking as exemplified by 
Western philosophical systems that precede post-structuralism and secondly, it addresses the                                                         14 On the memorial page in Otherwise Than Being, Levinas wrote “To the memory of those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti‐Semitism.”  
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question of what lies outside of totality to found subjectivity in the idea of infinity (“Totality 
and Infinity” 26). In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas goes beyond Totality and Infinity to 
focus less on otherness, but instead on the existential implications of what this otherness 
means for selfhood. In Otherwise Than Being Levinas claims that subjectivity is ultimately 
not a being for-the-self, but a being for-the-other (“Otherwise than Being” 69-70). Alterity, 
as the center of subjectivity, is thus the main focus explored in Otherwise Than Being. 
For the purposes of this thesis Levinas’s notions of totality and infinity are important 
to explain certain attitudes encountered in Paradise. Levinas’s view of ethics as first 
philosophy serves as a guiding principle whereby the various strands in this thesis can be 
drawn together to reach a conclusion similar to what Levinas is making – albeit from a 
different perspective. 
 Levinas’s writing is a response to the inhumanity perpetrated during World Wars I 
and II, in particular as it was done by nations that were supposed to have epitomized the 
highest development of Western philosophy and culture (Marcus 22). As such, his critique is 
especially directed at the work of Husserl and Heidegger whose philosophy on human 
subjectivity was current at the time. Levinas argues that both Husserl and Heidegger failed to 
address the intrinsically totalitarian stance that saw otherness reduced to sameness, i.e. to 
totalized categories of normative standards and identities (Marcus 24) by which atrocities 
could be justified. 
Whereas Western philosophy, according to Levinas, considered knowledge as capable of 
being all-inclusive and ultimate in comprehension, he argued that not all meaning could be 
made intelligible (“Totality and Infinity” 80, “Of God Who Comes to Mind” 55). Levinas 
  
14 
views totality thinking as reductive theory since it objectifies everything to a finite, knowable 
object (“Totality and Infinity” 13, 43). 
Levinas instead proposes a modality of reflection that is both receptive and 
responsible to what he calls the Infinite, which he discovers in the “face” of the other person. 
Beyond the features of another person’s face, Levinas finds there is an “exteriority” or 
infinity that reveals a trace of what is beyond perception, judgment and knowledge (“Totality 
and Infinity”194-201, “Ethics and Infinity” 86). For Levinas the relation to the face is 
immediately ethical, as it spells the first mode of “knowing,” as a facing or responding to the 
other (“Ethics and Infinity” 87).15 For Levinas the self’s undeniable responsiveness to the 
face of the other person is also a response-ability, which is ultimately a responsibility. 
In Ethics and Infinity (1985) Levinas claims that, “responsibility is the essential, 
primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity” (95). Marcus, however, points out that 
Levinas does not effectively substantiate this claim (45). Throughout the development of his 
oeuvre Levinas does indeed substantiate this claim. This substantiation however takes place 
in unrepresentable notions, much like explaining the Real does for Lacan. 
Levinas describes the “saying” of what can’t be said as a betrayal and thus 
deconstructively duplicates terms to unsay and resay the “said” through terms like “more 
passive than all passivity,” “denudation of denuding,” and “infinition of the infinite” 
(“Otherwise than Being” 14, 49, 93). The ethical relationship is, moreover, described as 
                                                        15 The face disrupts the self’s autonomous existence and egoistic enjoyment of the world and calls it into question in favor of the existence of the other person (“Totality and Infinity” 43, 82‐84). It is in this face‐to‐face relation that the self discovers its ethical relation with the other person, which is one of responsibility. For Levinas the relation to the face is immediately ethical, as it spells the first mode of “knowing,” as a facing or responding to the other (Ethics and Infinity” 87).  
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“beyond thematizable presence” and “irreducible to knowledge” (“On Thinking-of-the-
Other: Entre Nous” 168). It is also described as “a relation without relation” (“Totality and 
Infinity” 80). This responsibility is described as a response to the other “before any 
understanding, for a debt contracted before any freedom and before any consciousness and 
any present”(“Otherwise than Being” 12). Peperzak describes this as having been 
commanded outside of time, in a time immemorial (108). 
 It is clear from such language that a whole philosophical explication of time and new 
concepts is required to explain Levinas’s argument of responsibility as the fundamental 
structure of subjectivity. Such a course of action will, however, eclipse the purpose of this 
thesis. I therefore acknowledge these arguments, but instead connect an aspect of Lacan’s 
theory of subjectivity to Morrison’s treatment of responsibility in Paradise and argue that 
Morrison offers a challenge as ethically demanding as Levinas. 
For both Levinas and Lacan subjecthood rests on infinity, on what cannot be 
completely grasped, on a split, on otherness. The implications of this lacking subject in 
Lacan’s theory inevitably escapes essentialism and reductionism of the other (Stavrakakis 
23). Levinas’s theory similarly rejects totalizing the other and instead insists that the self is 
responsible for the other. In her own way Morrison portrays both these arguments in 
Paradise thus exhorting the reader to “shoulder the work” in this manner of responsibility for 
the other. 
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CHAPTER 4.  IDENTITY MIRRORING 
4.1 Direct Mirrors of Identity 
Mirrors and identity reflections, key elements in the novel, inform a reading well 
captured by the break-up between Deek and Steward. Morrison depicts Deek as experiencing 
a hitherto unknown incompleteness when he and Steward stop talking (i.e. having their 
wordless conversations) after the attack on the Convent (300). The twinned relationship as 
between separate individuals, yet as complete, may be indicative of the fact that human 
identity is incomplete without the other; that the self is always a double of the “you and me.” 
This argument can be extended to the macro level of society. 
In this section I consider cases where Morrison portrays characters as accepting/ 
embracing their own identity as reflections from other characters. It can be argued that this 
section deals with the relationship of the subject and the (small) other although Lacan 
explained that the Imaginary is nevertheless always taken up in the Symbolic. 
Morrison describes Connie’s love for Mother Mary Magna also known as Mother, the 
nun who rescued her as an orphan and raised her, as “her rope to the world” (247). This rope 
metaphor evokes an image of an umbilical chord, which implies an intimate connection of 
vital dependence. Losing Mother becomes a loss of identity for Connie: "She had no 
identification, no insurance, no family, no work. Facing extinction, waiting to be evicted, 
wary of God, she felt like a curl of paper – nothing written on it – lying in the corner of an 
empty closet" (247-48).  
On the one hand, this depiction reveals her deepest feelings in a way that enables the 
reader to “step in” to her pain. In this description the author’s imagination equips the reader 
to step beyond the words articulated on the page. The reader can imagine Connie’s strong 
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sense of feeling left-behind, forgotten-about, like an empty closet deserted in silence and 
nothingness. This image magnifies the desolation of – not a piece of paper, lying flat and 
untouched by time, but a curl of paper – sapped by time to lose its original (controlled) form 
of flatness. As if an extension of the umbilical rope impression, this curl of paper calls to 
mind an image of a curled up person in the fetal position. This sense is strengthened by the 
emphasis wrought by “– nothing written on it –” as if aborted. Morrison has metaphors 
trigger metaphors leaving the reader with an image of a fifty-four year old woman feeling 
like an aborted fetus cowering after the loss of an other - another person who was integral to 
her identity.  
On the other hand, the blank piece of paper indicates her lack of documentation, 
which would have connected her to a past as well as to a society for whom not being on 
record means not existing. While the metaphor demonstrates Lacan’s point of the role of the 
other’s imprint on the self, the non-existent documentation underscores Levinas’s point that 
before and beyond known facts of a person, the self understands there is this person with 
whom one necessarily has a relation of response. The simple yet powerful dynamics of this 
relational tango abound in Paradise.  
The intertwined nature of identity is powerfully pictured in the following scenario 
between two lovers: “He kisses her lightly, then leans on his elbow. ‘I’ve traveled. All over. 
I’ve never seen anything like you. How could anything be put together like you?  
Do you know how beautiful you are? Have you looked at yourself?’” (231) To this the 
woman replies, “I’m looking now.” She sees herself through his eyes and thus as he sees her. 
It is therefore in looking at her and seeing her that the man “defines” her. At the end of 
Paradise, right before Steward shoots Connie, Deek looks at her and his life is altered to the 
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point where he sees himself and no longer likes who he had become. When this relationship 
comes to an end, Connie laments “he and I are the same” (241), suggesting in loving another 
she loved herself or even that it was herself in him that she loved.  
 The idea of knowledge of the self as “a test of love” is presented in the thoughts of 
Arnette on her wedding day. “She believed she loved him absolutely because he was all she 
knew about her self – which was to say, everything she knew of her body was connected to 
him” (148). This knowledge of the self is portrayed as a self that knows itself only through 
the other. Morrison nonetheless qualifies this self-knowledge twice by juxtaposing and 
contradicting, “believed” with loved him “absolutely” and “all” she knew about herself with 
everything she knew of her “body.” To believe implies there is not absolute knowledge. 
Similarly “all” is qualified and thus limited to her “body” – thereby betraying to the reader 
that her love was not as absolute as she thought although it was all she knew and understood 
about herself. When Arnette continues, “Except for Billie Delia, no one had told her there 
was any other way to think of herself” it seems that it is the Other of the norms and 
unconscious organization of society that informs her view of herself. Expressed by a double 
negative and absent of verbs Arnette thinks, “Not her mother; not her sister-in-law,” told her 
to think of herself in another way. This view reveals that she learned from these women that 
you passively know about yourself through your husband. 
Like these intimate relationships, Seneca also views herself through the eyes of her 
boyfriend and Mavis views herself from her husband’s perspective. Whereas Mavis believes 
herself to be “the dumbest bitch on the planet,” Seneca believes herself to be “hopeless” (37, 
131). And yet these reflections could as easily be positive with similarly powerful results as 
seen when Connie gives Mavis a simple compliment. 
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After Connie complimented Mavis’s hands as beautiful and strong, we see Mavis 
“watching her suddenly beautiful hands” (42, my italics). Even after her mind travels back to 
the road and the mission she was on to go West, it returns to admire her hands (42). Not only 
does she begin to look at her hands differently, but her actions are also influenced by this “re-
definition” for we see “now, working pecans, she tried to economize her gestures without 
sacrificing their grace.” These thoughts bespeak a changed self-image brought about by 
another’s input. Whereas her self-definition leaned towards incompetence it shifted to a 
greater sense of self-awareness and appreciation with Connie’s simple compliment so that 
she now views herself as able and characterized by qualities of beauty. She moreover takes 
this compliment further and elevates it to the point where she finds it makes her graceful and 
elegant.  
The characters of Seneca and Mavis demonstrate a further aspect of the identity in 
relation to others as it relates to agency. Mavis, generally portrayed as incompetent and 
feeble, gets stuck in the middle of nowhere without gas. As could be expected from the 
fearful and abused Mavis, she waited, dozed, waited some more and dozed some more (37). 
Then “suddenly she sat up, wide awake, and decided not to starve. Would the road girls just 
sit there?” (37) Her strength comes from remembering the numerous girls she gave rides to 
on her journey. The thought that “the road girls” would not just sit there and wait for 
someone else to take charge on their behalf, motivated Mavis to do something deliberate to 
help herself. In this instance we see agency coming from the self’s identification with others. 
Similarly so, Seneca acts out of character when she jumps off the truck to follow a 
disoriented Sweetie on an unfamiliar road (126). Agency thus follows both from the subject 
accepting the projections of others as well as from the self identifying with others. The self 
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does, however, not lack freedom in terms of accepting or rejecting the reflections of others 
on the self. 
During the raid on the Convent, one of the stalkers found himself in a bathroom with 
mirrors and noticed “only one mirror has not been covered with chalky paint and that one the 
man ignores. He does not want to see himself stalking females” (9). The text continues, 
“With relief he backs out and closes the door. With relief he lets his handgun point down” 
(9). The word “relief” appears twice in these sentences that follow each other. The man’s 
relief at not seeing his face reflected in that mirror reveals the importance of the other’s view 
of the self. The man chooses to avoid an accusation he does not want to confront. This mirror 
would have shown this pursuer to himself, as a killer. Defined by himself he can still get 
away with thinking of himself as the protector of his community. But the mirror of a Convent 
bathroom will reflect him from the hunted women’s point of view - as a killer. The man 
therefore chooses the identity he is willing to accept, just as he chooses to ignore what he 
knows about himself.  
A second reference to a mirror is the figurative mirror revealed when K.D. describes 
his slapping Arnette to his uncles. Their reaction is described as “like a mirror image in 
gestures if not in looks, Steward spit fresh Blue Boy while Deek lit a cigar” (55). They are 
the primary twins in this novel and yet this image does not conjure a picture of similarity. 
They don’t look alike, they both react, but not in the same way. So what is Morrison 
suggesting with this description as mirror-like? The description of this image implies that 
there is unity in spite of division. At the same time the reader may be prepared through this 
image for the contradiction between the brothers, which will yet be revealed.  
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A third mirror scene is sketched in a conversation between Connie and Mother. When 
Connie tells Mother she may think her eyes are still blue, but they have become old-lady 
washed-out, Mother asks for a mirror in order to check for herself (47). This scene presents 
“the mirror” in a different light. No matter what other people say about us, whether they are 
loved ones or enemies, it is still our responsibility to ourselves to verify this information. 
Taking responsibility for the self means evaluating reflections others project onto the self. 
Thus, being told you are “a no good bitch” it does not automatically mean you are. At the 
same time, positive reflections such as compliments of competence or beauty also need the 
self’s assent.  
A fourth mirroring is presented in Connie’s reflection on the humanness of Christ and 
the fact that “His suffering would mirror ours” (225). Jesus, as the other in whom the 
suffering of the subject is mirrored, suggests the distinction, yet unity between God and 
humans. Beyond these direct references to mirrors, mirroring is abundant in Paradise.  
The harsh confrontation with Fairly saw one traveler comment: “Us free like them; 
was slave like them. What for is this difference?” (14). In other words, how can they not see 
that we are the same? We reflect each other. We share a social, economic, and political past 
and present. How can they not recognize themselves in us shortly before they became self-
sufficient? This question of course reverberates across time and human borders. It is the 
universal question to each reader; how is the next person so different from you that you 
cannot see yourself in his or her situation? More specifically though, Tally, in Toni 
Morrison’s (Hi)stories and Truth, points out that the years after slavery saw African 
Americans eager to leave behind remnants of “inferior” qualities of those culturally specific 
traits that reminded them of their own poor and bedraggled past (25). Morrison is in effect 
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addressing African American’s definitions of themselves in the 1970s as it relates to their 
different social classes and their shades of skin color. 
The reflections discussed in this section underscore the Lacanian notion that the self’s 
identity is established and influenced by other people. Establishing this point forms a premise 
in the argument that I believe Morrison is making, that wars and discrimination can only be 
avoided when otherness is recognized as constitutive of the self. The connection between 
identity and responsibility for the other begins to take shape in the following section on 
indirect influences that inform identity. 
 
4.2 Indirect Mirrors of Identity 
In this section I discuss cases of identity formation where the self behaves in a way 
that reflects indirect reflections onto or from others. I specifically focus on Morrison’s 
portrayal of the men, but this is not to suggest that only men form their identity 
interdependently. The point I am trying to demonstrate is that Paradise indeed portrays 
identity as an interactive affair. This point is perhaps demonstrated clearest through the 
female characters of the Convent whose healing take place based on their identities 
overlapping as each shares in the dreamer’s tale (264). The two main matters this section 
explores are how both the Old Fathers (founders of Haven) and the New Fathers (founders of 
Ruby) define themselves in relation to their women and children and how the New Fathers 
identify with and define themselves in relation to the mandate of the Old Fathers. The 
mandate of the Old Fathers includes the town Ruby and the words of the Oven. This section 
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argues that the 8-rock16 men define themselves in relation to their ability to protect and 
provide for their women and children. Their manhood is portrayed as built on the degree to 
which the responsibility they feel for their women and children is fulfilled. This argument 
should not be mistaken with Levinas’s view of ethics as first philosophy, which reasons that 
the self’s identity is first and foremost an absolute responsibility for the neighbor. 
Notwithstanding my caution, I believe Morrison is making a claim for the interdependence of 
identity and responsibility for the other. 
Lacan’s notion of the capitalized Other, as operative in the Symbolic order, unlocks 
the relations that will be discussed in this section. It is less their women as “little others” who 
can be emulated that inform the identities of the men, than it is the women or the mandate of 
the Old Fathers, as symbolic Others, that affect their identities. 
It should be noted that although Steward and Deek Morgan are the main protagonists 
who will be discussed in these sections, the town’s people generally share their sentiments 
and motivations. This is especially evinced during the Christmas play when the town relives 
the Fairly Disallowing and more specifically by men other than the Morgans who aired their 
views during the discussion of the attack on the Convent, for Lone aptly notes “the only 
voice not singing belonged to the one conducting the choir” (280).  
 
4.2.1 The Old Fathers’ Identity: Mirrored in their Women 
The Oven had sentimental and monumental value for the 8-rock men in particular 
(103). On the one hand the Old Fathers saw a cook oven as a permanent fixture in the ground 
                                                        16 I distinguish the 8‐rock men from the New Fathers of Ruby. The 8‐rock men refer to all generations of 8‐rocks starting with the Haven founders and include the Ruby generations. 
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that would testify of them as freedmen having survived the ordeals they faced prior to 
successfully founding Haven. They triumphed over the humiliation and poverty of being 
routed out of offices held during Reconstruction and subsequently being reduced to field 
labor because nobody would give them jobs that required mental labor (99, 193). They had 
survived the natural elements, which they encountered during their trek West (14, 99). And 
they made it despite the Fairly rejection. The cook oven, like a womb, would testify to their 
virility to conquer difficulties and establish permanence. Most of all, the Oven is an 
attestation to the role their women play in their identities. 
For the Old Fathers, the true test of their triumph and achievement lay in the fact that 
none of their women had ever worked in a white man’s kitchen. The Oven, as a kind of 
communal kitchen, is in stark contrast to the white kitchens where the rape of their women 
was “if not a certainty a distinct possibility” (99). The thought of this danger to their women 
was too much for the men to even consider (99). It is then most probably for this reason that 
the men choose to believe that the blue-blackness of their skin testifies of them as a pure, 
“untampered” race since 1770 (193-4).17  
Cynthia Griffin Wolff observes in “’Margaret Garner’: A Cincinnati Story” (1991) 
that the slave woman’s voice had not been written into American culture until 1851 (438, fn                                                         17 The belief in racial purity is difficult to reconcile with the reality of slavery. The obsession the men have to keep their women safe contradicts the view that their women had always been safe and instead suggests that this belief is a powerful myth. Although the 8‐rocks are seen to reject all light skinned African Americans, subsequent to the Fairly Disallowing, it is possible to imagine that even before the Fairly encounter, that any light skinned children born by their women would not have been welcome in their midst since these children would be testimony to the vulnerability of their women and their own inability to provide the necessary protection. Moreover, the fact that the Morgan twins’ grandfather was nicknamed Coffee and his twin brother, Tea, (302) may be an indication of racial tampering in the very Morgan bloodlines as tea is generally not as dark as coffee. In order to maintain the fiction of their racial purity it is thus necessary to reject traces of the (white) other in themselves, but more importantly, the necessary fiction of their women’s safety can then be maintained, which would otherwise be too much for the men to bare.  
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2). She argues that while people who cared about the issues of abolition have heard of 
mothers being separated from their children, “the shocking unresolvable dilemma of the 
slave MOTHER had never been dissected” and thus thrust into American consciousness until 
the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1851) (original italics) (438, fn 2). Morrison’s 
Beloved (1987) confronts the reader with the slave mother’s moral behavior in the light of the 
fact that she did not own her own body, nor that of her own children (McKenzie 229). 
Beloved presents us with Sethe, tormented by the indignities of enslavement, who reasoned 
that murdering her children would be more compassionate than allowing them to endure 
slavery (Fuston-White 464). Sethe thought “No. No. Nono. Nonono” (155). She collected her 
children and took them “where no one could hurt them,” “where they would be safe” (155). 
As with Sethe, the value of keeping their wives and children safe dominates the lives of the 
8-rock men. Beloved not only presents us with the mother’s desire to protect, but the father 
and husband’s desire as well. It is Halle’s (Sethe’s husband) experience that is closer to that 
of the 8-rock men. It broke Halle to see Teacher’s nephews “take Sethe’s milk” (64-66). 
Halle’s inability to protect his wife caused him to lose his mind (65). 
For the 8-rock men it is similarly their ability to provide safety from such “kitchen” 
dangers that saw them value the Oven to a degree that the women could not understand 
(103). The magnitude of this ability to protect and provide for the women is at the heart of 
the impact the Fairly rejection had. 
 “It was the shame of seeing one’s pregnant wife or sister or daughter refused shelter 
that had rocked them, and changed them for all time. The humiliation did more than rankle; it 
threatened to crack open their bones” (95). It was thus the shame that had rocked them, their 
own impotence that had come close to cracking their bones. In Quiet as It’s kept: Shame, 
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Trauma, and Race in the Novels of Toni Morrison, J. Brooks Bouson points out that in 
classic shame defense, the people respond to Fairly’s dismissal with reactive pride for they 
became prouder and stiffer subsequent to this rejection (196). This humiliation is “seared in 
the memories of the Old Fathers and has a formative influence on the collective Ruby 
memory and group identity” (Bouson 196). Paul D, in Beloved, perhaps best explains this 
bone-threatening shame. 
 Paul D listens to Sethe’s recount of murdering her daughter and he recalls his time in 
Alfred, Georgia where he did not have the right or permission to enjoy or love anything – 
because it all belonged to the men with the guns (154). To survive the danger of loving he 
picked the tiniest things to love, because loving a real person “could split you wide open” 
(154). Sethe’s story causes him to conclude that her love for her children “could cleave the 
bone” (156). Paul D’s understanding that the bone can be split when love cannot be 
protected, resonates with the views of the 8-rock men. For the men feel their own identities 
are threatened when their women – as others who inform their identity – are threatened and 
they cannot protect them against such adversity.  
It is not only protection that informs the men’s attitude towards their women. We also 
see the pride and joy, as well as the determination and willingness for sacrifice, to be able to 
provide for their women. An example is the labor and secret saving for two harvests to buy a 
winter coat for a wife (8). Steward’s memory of seeing “the light in his mother’s eyes” (8) 
seems slightly idealized and fits his views of male and female roles. Also men would spend 
their earnings from the first harvest or first cuts from the herd to buy their women blue 
dresses and bonnets (15). Without suggesting that their women are thought of as gods this 
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imagery suggests an almost Biblical devotion with the idea of first fruits, or a tenth of the 
first yield being offered to God. 
When the men thus decide on an oven in Haven, it symbolizes provision as well as an 
absence of white kitchen jobs and resultant children that would testify of such “racial 
tampering” (197). The Oven symbolizes the triumph of their manhood, their perseverance 
and their triumph of having made it and of being able to protect and provide for their women. 
 
4.2.2 The New Fathers’ Identity: Mirrored in their Women 
Ruby was founded after the disintegration of Haven. One of the reasons for this new 
beginning was to avoid contact with the “Out There” and keep it from seeping into a 
dwindling Haven. Out There is described as “where your children were sport, your women 
quarry, and where your very person could be annulled” (16). “Out there” remains a serious 
consideration for the people of Ruby, even when there is nothing to harm them for ninety 
miles around (8).  
Gauthier points out that the Morgan twins not only constructed female identity on 
idealized images of women, but also that they reciprocally constructed their own identity and 
sense of masculinity as protectors of such women (402). This idealized vision is moreover in 
addition to the values portrayed in the stories they grew up on. 
Like the Old Fathers, the New Fathers base a fundamental aspect of their identity on 
their ability to fulfill the responsibility they feel to provide for and protect their women and 
children. They therefore vigilantly guard against outside intrusion that could disturb the 
tranquility of their hard-won community. When a group of strangers would screech into town 
and intimidate Ruby women with sexual gestures, the townsmen would come out from 
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wherever they were and intimidate such men right back out of town with their loosely held 
guns (13). According to Tally this “obsession and obligation” to keep Ruby safe from outside 
intrusion leads the men attack the Convent (65). This reaction – where men would leave their 
jobs and not care that all business would literally come to a standstill – is akin to the Old 
Fathers’ response to white kitchen work: they refused to have their women exposed to sexual 
violations of white men. 
The men prided themselves on the fact that the people of Ruby were free and 
protected so that a sleepless woman could go for a walk in the middle of the night and know 
that she was not prey for ninety miles around (8). During the attack on the Convent, in a long 
stream of consciousness, an unidentified man (who sounds like Steward) imagines the above-
mentioned sleepless woman’s night walk. Twice he thinks how she can walk without light 
and without fear; twice he mentions that nothing thinks she is prey (8-9). This image of 
absolute safety is further emphasized by the image of moonlight being the only source of 
light and the assurance that the woman would remain completely at ease at a foreign or 
sudden sound coming from the side of the road (8). His description gives the impression that 
this woman has never been exposed to anything remotely threatening, thereby showing how 
good a job the men have done of keeping Ruby a safe haven. Missing the irony of the 
situation, this man notes the safety of this Ruby woman whilst he feels justified in attacking 
the Convent women. 
As a perfect example of the operation of the Symbolic order, we learn that Steward 
and Deek grew up on the stories of the past forty years, thus being shaped by the language 
and values of their elders. Steward remembers the stories he heard of blue dresses and 
bonnets men bought for the women with their first earnings (15, my italics). This joy and 
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pride the men felt in being able to provide their women with pretty things is also experienced 
in Steward’s life. While this is not a father providing for a daughter, we see that the 
principles and attitudes of the Old Fathers had been reproduced in Deek and Steward when 
they were young. Deek and Steward felt very proud of themselves for having thrown a 
surprise birthday party for their only sister, Ruby (8) – their first steps in bringing a woman 
happiness and showing her they can care for her. Moreover, when Deek thinks of his sister, 
he thinks of how he and Steward had protected her all their lives (113). 
Steward similarly “relives” the Fairly rejection and imagines the humiliation and this 
thought threatens to crack his bones as well. Simply recalling the level of helplessness of the 
Old Fathers’ Fairly experience makes Steward feel like he wants to shoot somebody (96). 
Not only does he identify so completely with his elders that he feels the threat to his own 
person disintegrating, for the image of bones cracking suggests that the supporting structure, 
the deepest part, and possibly the strongest part of his identity became so vulnerable that it 
could split apart. This threat to the supporting structure of his life sees him want to take a life 
in retaliation. The 8-rock men experience their responsibility as both the backbone of their 
identity, but also the thing that renders them most vulnerable and most dangerous when 
threatened. 
The New Fathers unfortunately take their responsibility to the extent that they define 
and determine the role of women and children. In the description of the sleepless woman, her 
possible thoughts are described as her thinking of “… food preparations, war, or family 
things, or lift her eyes to stars and think of nothing at all” (8). While these are legitimate 
things to think about, they suggest that beyond domestic concerns and who was away at war 
the man believes the woman probably has nothing else she could think about. From time to 
  
30 
time the men indeed treat the women as if their only cares are domestic and as if being good 
is the only moral possibility for women. 
This unidentified man’s thoughts continue to compare the Convent women to the 
Ruby women, which gives the reader the insight into what he regards as the proper role and 
place of women. He is disgusted to find that these women do not abide by the schedule and 
sense of order men consider appropriate to womanhood: “Slack, they18 think. August just 
around the corner and these women have not sorted, let alone washed, the jars” (5). In 
contrast to this assessment “there wasn’t a slack or sloven woman anywhere in town” (8). 
Instead, the “proper” role of women is portrayed by: “Quiet white and yellow houses full of 
industry; and in them were elegant black women at useful tasks, orderly cupboards minus 
surfeit or miserliness; linen laundered and ironed to perfection; good meat seasoned and 
ready for roasting” (111). Indeed Deek thinks of Soane as “a good woman” who keeps a 
“good home” and does “good works” (112). This image seems to be both the expectations of 
the men as well as their preferred view of women. For the men, women who differ from 
these standards, like the Convent women, do not deserve their protection. Soane, moreover, 
“worked thread like a prisoner: daily, methodically, for free, producing more lace than could 
ever be practical” (53). Restricted to being good and monotonously producing unneeded lace 
testify to the confines the Ruby women live by. 
The emphasis on protection and provision in combination with the above descriptions 
reveals a very strong patriarchal worldview in which both genders have their assigned roles. 
As such it becomes easy to usurp the power of another as men on occasion think for women                                                         18 The stream of consciousness moves from the singular to the plural, which may indicate either Morgan twinned thoughts or that other men, besides the man who thinks about the sleepless woman, share this view of the Convent women as slack. 
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as portrayed by Arnold Fleetwood saying he will “arrange” his daughter’s mind for her or 
when Deek tells Soane “you don’t have to [understand], I do” (61, 107). The abilities and 
work of women are moreover easily taken for granted, as is illustrated when Soane thinks to 
herself that Deek will bring home quail, saying “This ought to take care of supper” as if he 
did her a favor and as if there was nothing more to it (100). The time and effort Soane would 
need to put in to prepare the quail does not seem to cross Deek’s mind. Similarly the fact that 
she must clean up after him seems to simply be part of her job description as a woman (105). 
The domesticity of the kitchen scene in which Deek throws his wet hunting clothes on the 
floor and urges Soane to bring him a cup of coffee (105-107) is indicative of the status quo of 
male-female relations. From the reader’s perspective Soane feels a certain amount of 
discontentment toward Deek’s attitude regarding the quail, his response to the young people 
wanting to change the words of the Oven, his view of an unknown girl in high heels, and his 
attitude toward friends’ money problems. The measure of frustration she feels is probably 
related to the fact that she knows she can do little to change Deek’s mind about these matters, 
for he does not budge to consent to her views, but instead dismisses them playfully or 
changes the angle of the subject. The Other of the symbolic order seems reflected here in that 
the unconscious organization of their society seems to “restrict” Soane to a role which she 
seems frustrated by, but is seemingly unable to alter.  
While not exactly a New Father, because he dies before the founding of Ruby, Deek 
and Steward’s older brother Elder’s experience demonstrates the 8-rock instilled value of 
responsibility for women. Steward recalls how he and his brothers were “honed,” with no 
slack being cut, to understand their history and their future purpose and the responsibility it 
brought with it (94). The day Elder returned from fighting overseas (94-5) he saw two white 
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men beat up a black woman, who seemed to be a prostitute. He in turn beat them up, but ran 
away in order not to be jailed. His could not forgive himself for having run away and having 
abandoned the woman there (95). It is thus not his cowardice – as some may judge his 
running away as – but his failure to protect an unknown woman that Elder deplored in 
himself. “Whatever he felt about her trade, he thought about her, prayed for her till the end of 
his life” (94). His wife had mended the torn uniform, but he told her “to remove the stitches, 
to let the jacket pocket flap, the shirt collar stay ripped, the buttons hang or remain missing” 
(94). His dying wish was to be buried in the uniform with its rips on display (95). Instead of 
forgetting about this incident, he kept its memory alive. The implied statement made by his 
uniform was louder than the words on his tombstone. It is by this failure that he judged his 
self-image. Elder’s response reveals three things in contrast to Steward’s reaction to this 
story. 
 Steward only sees that the woman was a streetwalker and he even imagines the 
man’s fist as his own (95). In Steward’s view such women deserve no protection, just like the 
Convent women, whom he views as prostitutes. 
 Elder’s reaction reveals that he can identify with that woman as an African 
American, sympathize with her as the weak, but most of all, that he sees himself as her 
protector, irrespective of her moral standing. In having failed this assaulted woman, Elder felt 
he failed himself – his view of himself, as he was taught – to be a protector of women. 
Steward, on the other hand, does not easily identify with the plight of the weak or with 
women whom he judges to have loose morals. Elder’s attitude suggests that he would have 
condemned the way his brothers dealt with the Convent women. Elder seems like the type of 
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man whom the Old Fathers recommended – the type who would not judge, rout or destroy 
the needy, the defenseless, the different (302).  
 
4.3 The New Fathers’ Identity: Mirrored in Ruby 
In many ways the men, especially the Morgan twins, see Ruby as a reflection of their 
own identity. For Deek and Steward this is the case for numerous reasons. It is not so much 
the fact that their family largely financed the town (115), as it is the close bond they feel with 
the mission to revenge the Disallowings by being successful at creating a haven separate 
from those who rejected them (194). Deek sees himself and Steward as the true heirs of Ruby 
for having “repeated exactly” what their father and grandfather had done (113). This 
replication reveals the seriousness they felt at fulfilling the task to create a home for a people 
of racial purity, whom they had been taught would otherwise be shunned by the world (194). 
The problem with this close identification, Reverend Richard Misner points out, is that it has 
left these men without stories of their own (161).  
In Steward’s view, the expectations of the Old Fathers’ mission were high, but they 
were embraced and met (94). These expectations and the memory of the lives and work of 
the Old Fathers serve as the measuring rod by which Steward determines his actions, because 
recalling them settled his resolve in how to deal with the young people who wanted to change 
the words of the Oven (99). 
It is also Deek’s near betrayal of this mandate, which could have seen the failure of 
Ruby come about, that had incensed Steward (279), because Ruby’s failure would have 
meant “the permanent threat to his cherished view of himself and his brother” (279). It was 
this threat that topped his anger, which further reveals the close connection between the 
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Morgan identity and Ruby. The depth of the Morgan twins’ commitment to the founding and 
defending of Ruby is instilled through having grown up on the stories of 8-rock history. 
These stories provided the socially available objects of identification for the identity 
formation of these twins. “They listened to, imagined and remembered every single thing 
because each detail was a jolt of pleasure, erotic as a dream, out-thrilling and more 
purposeful than even the war they had fought in” (16). The impact of this exposure and its 
subsequent effect cannot be missed. Every single thing and each detail triumphed and out 
thrilled even the pleasures of anything erotic. Most of all, the stories seem to have woven 
purpose into the very fabric of these twins who never forgot anything (13) – anything relating 
to 8-rock history, that is.  
The impression of a team of two powerful minds who “remember the details of 
everything that ever happened – things they witnessed and things they have not” and in 
addition to all the specifics, they also never forgot the message of these stories (13) suggests 
that nothing can be lost between the two of them. Such a view inevitably promotes totalizing 
thinking, because “everything about the way the world is,” is assumed to be known to them. 
For if they knew it all, how could there be anything in addition to such knowledge, any other 
perspective that may prove their knowledge incomplete or somehow faulty? Reducing others 
to fit the perspectives of such a worldview leads to the totalizing regimes of which Levinas 
warned. 
In their view, thus, “everything requires their protection” (12), which therefore 
justifies resorting to any means necessary to fulfill this responsibility. It is in order to make 
sure the “Out There” would not rot away their town that they attacked the Convent (5). The 
unidentified man who describes the woman walking in moonlight thinks, “his was a town 
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justifiably pleased with itself”… and “anybody who threatened the town’s view of itself were 
good taken care of” (8). From these thoughts it seems that the thinker at first separates 
himself, from the town in that it was the town in which he lived, but as a town cannot be 
pleased with itself, it is rather that he is pleased with the town. Ultimately, as the town cannot 
take good care of those who threaten its view, it is he as the enforcing instrument of such 
unwritten laws that is truly being reflected in the idea of the town’s dealing with 
misbehavior. It is thus his view of the town, and his view of himself that he will not allow to 
be threatened. 
Morrison uses the double of husband and wife Deek and Soane to deliver the message 
that the Ruby mission truly determines the parameters within which the people of Ruby can 
live out what they want and who they are. At the outset of their affair, Deek tells Connie: “a 
lot of people depend on me” (230). Soane later tells Connie: “he can’t fail at what he is 
doing. None of us can. We are making something” (240). Both the New Fathers and their 
families are thus greatly defined by being Rubyites. 
 
4.4 The Old and New Fathers’ Identity: Mirrored in the Oven’s Words 
4.4.1 The Old Fathers’ Identity: Mirrored in the Oven’s Words 
The Oven words, coined in response to the Fairly rejection, are of uncertain origin. 
Although it is unclear whether they were heard somewhere, invented, or whispered (7), what 
is clear is the symbolic power they hold. The words are remembered as “Beware the furrow 
of His Brow” (86, 195). We have seen the high value the men place on fulfilling their 
responsibility for their women and children. Even before to the Fairly encounter the 8-rock 
men did everything in their power to keep their dependents safe. Their opinion of themselves 
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as well capable of maintaining this image of themselves is captured in the attitude with which 
they approached Fairly. “Smart, strong, and eager to work their own land, they believed they 
were more than prepared – they were destined” (13-14). Had they not experienced “five 
glorious years of remaking a country” and a hundred and twenty years of maintaining their 
“uncorruptible worthiness” of racial purity (193-4) even if it meant begging for sweatwork 
(5, 193)? They felt themselves within reach of self-determination that would exclude threats 
to their person. 
The first time Morrison offers the reasons for the rejection, there is no mention of the 
color of the people’s skin as the motivation behind what will become known as the 
Disallowing. Their response to the rejection is described thusly: 
It stung them into confusion to learn they did not have enough money to  
satisfy the restrictions the “self-supporting” Negroes required. In short, they 
were too poor, too bedraggled-looking to enter, let alone reside in, the 
communities that were soliciting Negro homesteaders. (14) 
From this quote we see they were rejected because they did not have enough money and they 
looked too poor and bedraggled, which confirmed this poverty. While the issue of skin color 
may have contributed to the rejection, the issue of finances19 was a very practical and 
legitimate consideration for the Fairly homesteaders (Tally 28). In other words, if they had 
had enough money to be accepted into Fairly, they would not have been shamed at their 
inability to be able to pay for rest and food for their pregnant wives and daughters (95). If 
they had the money, they could accomplish what their images of themselves required. If they 
                                                        19 Tally argues that the deeper issue Morrison addresses with the economically based Fairly Disallowing, is really the nature of class within the black community (28). 
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had the money, they could be the men they believed they were. The symbolism of their lack 
of money directly reflected on themselves as inadequate. This failed self, threatened to crack 
their bones (95). As a survival mechanism the 8-rocks thus chose to blame the rejection on 
the color of their skin and not on their inability to live up to their own images. About their 
skin color they could do nothing; indeed, looking at it as a sign of racial purity adds value to 
their view of themselves (194). They could live with the memory that it is their skin color 
that set them apart from others and even solicited discrimination. They could not live with 
the idea that they failed after one hundred and twenty years of worthiness. 
 The 8-rocks no doubt had good reason to blame the rejection on their skin color. They 
were, until this experience, reluctant to offer the color of their skin as an excuse for how 
others treated them. In the past they “refused to believe what they guessed was the real 
reason that made it impossible” for them to find better work and they “suspected yet dared 
not say that their misfortune’s misfortune was due to the one and only feature that 
distinguished them from their peers” (193, my italics). Their hesitance to accept such a view, 
evident from the weakness of these italicized verbs, is wholeheartedly embraced in the 
aftermath of the Fairly refusal. It is as if the 8-rocks had put all their faith and their very last 
strength into reaching Fairly. They had nothing left but their own inner strength driven by 
their view of themselves. They could therefore not risk blaming their powerlessness in the 
face of this adversity on their own inadequacy. In order to move on from this state of utter 
vulnerability they turned the until-then unutilized value of their skin color into their strength. 
This experience was formative for them to forge their group identity on consolidating their 
own sense of racial superiority from this point forth (Bouson 197). The Oven’s words 
captured this remaking of a people. 
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4.4.2 New Fathers’ Identity: Mirrored in the Oven’s Words  
The Oven and its words have a dynamic history. Note, there is a huge distinction to 
be drawn between the symbolic impact of the Oven itself and its words. As such, both 
capture 8-rock history and function as mission statements for the New Fathers. The words of 
the Oven are also the focus of the young generation who want to change these words in order 
to redefine their life’s purpose. The Oven as physical structure symbolically captures the 8-
rock past. The values of this past had been transferred from the Old Fathers to the New 
Fathers. The young generation do not concern themselves with these values and seems 
unaware of what they are protected from as a result of their elders being concerned about 
keeping them safe from sexual and racial harassment (93). The Oven’s words similarly affect 
all three generations for they were coined by the Old Fathers to indicate their separation from 
others who were not 8-rock, the generation of the New Fathers lived by this separatist 
worldview, and the young generation wanted to reinterpret these words in order to embrace 
an inclusive worldview which would see them shoulder the work of the Civil Rights 
Movement with fellow (African) Americans. 
The 8-rock history of rejection that resulted in coining these words is well captured in 
the previous section and explains the sentiments of the generation that grew up on those 
stories. 
The reaction of the New Fathers to the proposed change to the Oven words are 
indicative of the place these words hold in their lives. They want to preserve the philosophy 
of these words, seen by the fierce defense of the Morgan brothers who threatened to blow off 
anybody’s head who would “ignore, change, take away, or add to the words” (87, 111). The 
magnitude of this threat recalls the authority and sanctity of the Bible.  
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The Oven words, remembered as “Beware the Furrow of His Brow,” cling to the 
unforgiveness of the serious discrimination the first Old Fathers’ generation as well as the 
New Fathers’ generation had to face. Steward recalls this history and thinks of the children 
who want to disrespect their elders who have saved them from humiliations they are not even 
aware of (93). Holding on to this rancor simultaneously gives the New Fathers license to 
discriminate and totalize others. From the New Fathers’ perspective these words truly 
function as the Law of the Father, in the Lacanian sense that it enforces social prohibitions 
and obligations, which in turn function as a mirroring that informs their identity. The 
problem arises when the young people want to change both the signifiers and the signifieds, 
in other words both the words and how they should be understood, in order to redefine the 
motto for their lives. 
The actual words on the Oven are “… the Furrow of His Brow” (86). The New 
Fathers remember it as having been “Beware the Furrow of His Brow.” The dispute between 
the two generations turns on whether the motto should be “beware,” “be,” or “we are” the 
furrow of his brow (87, 217, 298).  
Page points out that the young people’s proposed shift to “be” or “we are” suggest 
they want to live more participatory lives in this that they want to join their strengths with 
others’ strength to become involved in the larger social context of the country (640). 
Whereas their parents have a totalizing view on the matter, the younger generation wants to 
change the motto to one that embraces diversity. For the young people, the motto does not 
only concern the past, it rather confines the present and robs them of a future they want to 
define (83, 298).  
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Unbeknownst to them, “beware” need not only be interpreted as a command from 
God, as Rev. Pulliam argues (86). Patricia realizes that the pronoun “His” referred to the man 
who coined it and to the 8-rocks who would live up to it (217). It is thus not God who is the 
signified of “he,” but the 8-rocks themselves.  
Ironically, the New Fathers define themselves in relation to those they had rejected 
and whom they have been living in isolation from. This motto, as mentioned, is not limited to 
Deek and Steward only. At the Christmas play these sentiments are clearly demonstrated by 
many of the town’s citizens. The fury and tears of the town’s people at reliving this history 
during the play are captured by the repetition of “God will crumble you. God will crumble 
you” to which the audience agrees, “Yes He will. Yes He will” (211).  
And when the words of the Oven culminated in the attack on the Convent, the town’s 
people realized for the first time that they had become the world they had escaped (292), 
having internalized what they thought they had outfoxed (306). Levinas’s argument that 
responsibility is fundamental to the self’s subjectivity is aimed precisely at this type of 
situation. When people would recognize traces of the other person or group in themselves, 
outfoxing will remain outfoxing, which means atrocities and rejections of the past will not be 
repeated. 
The “terribleness” of their deeds left them “bewildered, angry, sad, frightened” (292). 
To describe an early morning “hunting” on nonsuspecting women with rope, handcuffs, 
Mace, and guns ” (3, 5) as “terrible” is an unsatisfactory description of the violence 
perpetrated. The men had come to hunt the women down under an “obligation” to “stampede 
or kill” them – like animals (3). “Terrible” evokes the idea of a people in shock, unable to 
find words to describe an experience of which the magnitude must still sink in. It moreover 
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intimates that the people of Ruby, especially the New Fathers, had not realized what 
poisonous “hood-eye snake” they were nurturing through their insistence on living by the 
totalizing motto of the Oven. 
The Old Father’s admonition not to hurt the weak and defenseless (302) seems to 
clash with the words of the Oven that encourage revenge on others. To the people of Ruby 
the attack on the Convent seems like a betrayal of the cause (292, 306), and yet, since the 
cause was that they have others beware the furrow of their brow, the cause implicitly justifies 
such behavior.  
Totalizing-thinking destroys the tolerance that infinity thinking encourages. 
Totalizing others and reducing them to the self’s image of them, in turn, renders the self 
vulnerable to similar totalization and reduction. Totalizing others thus perpetuates the cycle 
of destruction. 
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CHAPTER 5.  Totality and War 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section I consider the implications of Levinas’s philosophical critique of 
totality and infinity, by which he argues that it is reductive thinking that has formed the 
groundwork for totalizing systems such as the Nazi regime that justifies the complete 
destruction of otherness through genocide. In its stead, Levinas argues for infinity thinking, 
which understands that the otherness of the other person truly stretches beyond their 
knowable characteristics. Knowledge itself is always a reduction20 and Levinas, Lacan, and 
Morrison argue that it is always incomplete. Totality and infinity thinking operate on both 
micro and macro levels. Both individuals and groups can be totalized and thus treated like the 
simple objects or statistics, to which they have been objectified or rather – reduced. This 
point is especially evident in the medical field where patients can either be reduced to their 
illnesses or treated with the dignity that infinity thinking would afford them. Levinas’s 
argument begins with the individual, but expands to the group, for the way in which the self 
thinks about one Jew, will be the way in which all Jews are thought of. 
Paradise portrays a philosophy of infinity thinking in numerous ways. The structure 
is polyphonic, with nine chapters named after nine women and yet these nine chapters are 
filled with more voices than only the women the chapters were named after. Most evident of 
infinity thinking is the openness of both the ending, but also numerous inexplicable events 
within the novel from the open door or window that could give a glimpse into another realm                                                         20 Knowledge requires the isolation of certain features as against others or unknowable aspects so that a coherent whole can be formed, which would make sense of “everything” pertaining to the specific question being asked about the topic. The question asked about a certain subject directs the answer to a great extent and may be the first step in reductive thinking as the assumptions on which the question is based may already be biased.  
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that is after, in, or in-between life (302, 305, 307) to the healing effected in the Convent as a 
result of relationships open to the spiritual and shared identities with others (263-5). The 
openness of Paradise offers the reader a worldview of openness towards the other and 
otherness. 
 Krumholz maintains that perception of the self in the other creates common ground 
just as the perception of the other in the self creates new possibilities for self-knowledge (30) 
– and healing. Paradise shows that a rejection of difference on a group level results in a 
paradise that destroys itself, losing its paradisical nature (Krumholz 21).  
In what follows I will consider the ways in which people are totalized in Paradise and 
the consequences that followed such totalization. While these are not examples of 
doublesness per se, they are examples of mirrors or projections by which the self defines the 
other person, reading that person’s identity through the self’s prejudices, values and identity. 
Ron David argues that Paradise challenges us to re-evaluate how we view each other’s 
humanity (192). I lastly discuss the war-paradise dichotomy, which shows that totalizing 
always leads to war – and war is the misrecognition of both the transcendence of the other 
person as well as the self’s dependence on the other person. 
 
5.2 Totalized Women 
Menu’s light-skinned girl is variously labeled through prejudices deriving from the 
racial re-evaluation that followed the Fairly Disallowing. Other than Pat and Lone, who 
simply and neutrally call her his “sandy haired girl” or “pretty redbone girl” (195, 278), the 
rest of the people who think about her do so from a discriminatory position. Anna thinks of 
Menu’s girl as a “prostitute” (119). Steward calls her “the dung we left behind,” and one of 
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the Convent attackers thought of her as a “fast woman” (278). People are totalized and 
judged through the symbolism of these values to fit a mold of “the rejected” or “the 
accepted.” Thinking of her like this shows how deeply entrenched the motto of “reject those 
who rejected us” live in the Ruby people – even in those from whom one would not expect it. 
One such person is Anna, who had been living in Detroit for a number of years until she 
returned home to take over her father’s business. 
Anna’s hair receives a great deal of attention. Her hair is not straightened and 
seemingly in an afro, judged by the fact that it has to be shaped and that it is the ‘70s,  (119). 
She did not intend for it to be a statement, but it nonetheless solicited diverse and intense 
reactions, because to the people of Ruby it spoke of another world – a world the young 
people want to embrace, for they admired it, while Reverend Pulliam’s rejection expressed 
itself in a whole sermon preached on it (119). Of more importance to Anna was the fact that 
people’s reactions to her hair enabled her to identify who her true friends were (119). She 
describes the reactions she receives as measurable on a Geiger counter, registering 
“tranquility” in some and “the intensity of a rumbling, deep-down disorder” in others (119). 
This hair-affair is an excellent portrayal of just how identities are reflected onto the self as 
they are mirrored in the identities of those who judge Anna.  
The most totalizing and destructive affair in Paradise takes place in the way the New 
Fathers reflect their own fear and failures onto the Convent women. They connect everything 
that has gone wrong in Ruby to the Convent and find their evidence and confirmation for 
their suspicions in numerous ways. In this way they reduce the Convent women to fit the 
image of other and of threat. For Billie-Delia the “war” was between the Stallions, in terms 
of who controlled the mares and their foal (150). In other words it was about disobedience, 
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meaning who disagreed with the New Fathers and the way they see the world. Patricia comes 
to the same conclusion as Billie-Delia, that for racial purity it was the women who worried 
the men the most (217). 8-Rocks were controlled by the law that “the generations had to be 
not only racially untampered with but free of adultery too” (217). This law that would 
guarantee “unadulterated and unadulteried 8-rock blood” served to control the women, but 
the men as well. In totalizing others, they in turn totalized themselves. And this mark of their 
identity would ultimately be the motivating factor for totalizing and murdering the women 
with their “loose” ways who seemed to threaten this identity. Billie-Delia says men saw the 
mutiny of the mares and got rid of the women (308). Indeed, the Convent women were 
uncontrolled, unmanned-over, unconfined and undefined. So much so that their presence had 
threatened the Morgan lineage twice through the affairs of Deek and Connie and that of KD 
and Gigi. Deek’s affair could have seen the end of the mission to found Ruby and both his 
and KD’s affairs could have resulted in adulterated and adulteried 8-rock blood (279). 
Steward could neither tolerate nor forgive them for “sullying his personal history with their 
streetwalkers’ clothes and whores’ appetites; mocking and desecrating the vision that carried 
him and his brother through a war” and enabled them to found a town (279).  
In section 4.2.2, on how the New Fathers mold their identity on their women and 
children, it was clear that the “mares” were indeed well under control. Their foals are, 
however, considered to be out of control, demonstrated by their “cut me some slack” attitude 
and their desire to change the words and motto of the Oven (95). Men like Steward could not 
shoot their own foals and therefore vented their anger on the Convent women whom they 
blamed for the behavior of their children (85, 277). Similarly, Wisdom Poole blamed them 
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for his lack of control over his siblings and the Fleetwoods blamed them for Jeff’s broken 
children (277). 
During the attack, the men’s totalization of the women are portrayed in how they 
interpret the things they see. The women are described as “detritus” (4), thought of as up to 
“devilish things” (7), their rooms are described as not “normal rooms” (7, 8) and the cellar is 
even described as the “devil’s bedroom, his bathroom, and his nasty playpen” (17), the 
Convent is thought of as “diseased” (8), certain things they see are imagined to be used for 
the “torture of children” (8), or to be ritual “offerings” (9), and the women are thought of as 
belonging to some or other “cult” (11). The letter the men see is described as “ a letter 
written in blood so smeary its satanic message cannot be deciphered” (7), is really the letter 
that a young Seneca fought over in foster homes, because it was the only thing she had left 
from her sister-mother who abandoned her before she had even learned to read (128). Deek 
thinks of the Convent as a brothel (114). The discovery in the spring of the car with the dead 
family is blamed on the nearby Convent (11, 272-3) - a connection Steward could easily have 
made with the lost white family who had needed gas and directions on a day when a blizzard 
had threatened (121-2). Outrages of things going wrong in Ruby took the form of evidence 
against the Convent (11). When the young people thus began “acting up” it was blamed on 
the Convent (85). Everything that was considered not natural that had been happening in and 
around Ruby is ascribed to the Convent and the fact that they are believed to be witches with 
powers (275-7).  
This totalizing thinking culminated in an attack to exterminate the Convent women. 
Subsequent to this act the Ruby inhabitants see themselves and the New Fathers in a new 
light. They see themselves as having become what they thought they had left behind. The 
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attack crystallized the fact that they themselves had become the “disallowers” who objectify 
and totalize others.   
 
5.3 War-Paradise Totality 
The word war is used in different contexts in Paradise to deliver a paradoxical and 
thus emphasized impact. My interest in exploring its use lies in the fact that it was the novel’s 
initial title and also because to a great extent, war can be regarded as the opposite of paradise; 
war is a hell, the opposite of paradise, which would be assumed to be the absence of the 
horrors of war. A narrow definition that would fit the argument presented in this thesis, is 
that war is totalization of the other and ultimately its rejection and or destruction. Paradise is 
an interrogation of “why paradise necessitates exclusion” (Bouson 192, Farnsworth 156). 
Morrison’s interest was to explore the idea of what happened to those who were excluded 
from/ rejected by the “come prepared or not at all” African American homesteads that were 
founded after Reconstruction ended (Bouson 192). Paradise is, at the same time, 
commenting on the United States as a paradise, paradoxically built on exclusion and the 
objectification of a whole people. 
“War” is at the centre of three concentric arguments, which begin with Billie-Delia’s 
view of the underlying politics in Ruby as a “war” between the Stallions (150). The argument 
then extends to portray Soane’s view that her sons would be safer in the Vietnam War than in 
the United States. Reverend Misner’s experience of war overlaps with that of Soane, but it 
also extends beyond it. 
Billie-Delia’s view of the war between the Stallions, in terms of who controlled the 
mares and their foals, is specific to the community of Ruby (150). This stance reveals the fact 
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that despite the apparent absence of “Out There” in Ruby, the people are nonetheless not 
living in paradise, because “In Here” operates on strict controls, meant to negate “Out There” 
realities, which, in effect, disables “In Here” from creating its own reality not contingent on 
“Out There.” Allegorically this scenario inverts both the outside-inside dichotomy and the 
black-white dichotomy. Outside and inside, like self and other, can be made applicable to any 
individual and group, based on race, class, language, place and more. Moreover, the danger 
of rejecting the outside or the other secures the possibility of ultimately rejecting the self, i.e. 
totalizing and damaging your own to fit a reduced view of them.  
Soane thought her sons would be safer out there in the war in Vietnam, than in here in 
the United States where they ran the risk of being lynched and imprisoned for no reason other 
than the fact that they were African American (100-1). Paradise comments on two relations 
through this impression. The greatest indictment is leveled at a country where a mother had 
reason to believe the battlefields of foreign countries offered a safer place for her sons than 
their own country. Although Soane based her assumption of the relative safety of war on the 
fact that other men have returned from war (100-1), the reader understands that Morrison 
employs war as a metaphor to juxtapose the general notion of war as a situation of horrors 
against Soane’s notion of war as safety in comparison to the situation of supposed peace in 
the country of the free. Thus, if the horrors of war look like peace in comparison to the 
situation for young black men in the USA, then the situation in the USA must have been 
exceptionally horrific. Secondly though, Paradise cautions the reader to recognize that 
paradise or safety is not only the absence of bombs or lynchings and imprisonments from 
others. There can be no paradise despite the absence of such evils, when totalizing thinking is 
accepted against infinity thinking. Totalizing others is war. 
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Reverend Misner considers the clergy during the Civil Rights movement as being 
involved in a war (1159-60). The opposition they experience, however, does not only come 
from the US government and racist Americans; they even experience hostility from local 
communities such as Ruby. Pat calls Reverend Misner’s Civil Rights class a “war” class 
(207) and he understands that Reverend Pulliam’s love sermon was really a declaration of 
“war” on his work, because his teaching saw children question, criticize, and defy the 
identity of the elders and their history.  
In all three cases the issue of doubleness and identity is relevant. The “Stallions” 
build their identity in response to their responsibility for the “mares” and “foals” and yet they 
totalize them instead of allowing their infinity to enrich the community and even the identity 
of the stallions. A similar misrecognition of the whole of American identity is portrayed 
when black Americans are not recognized as the “twin” of white Americans, despite having 
fought as one for one motherland in foreign wars (194). Thirdly, as much as white people do 
not recognize black people as their double in American identity, so too the people of Ruby 
neither recognized their identity and role in “white America” nor their shared identity with 
other black people who happened to not be of 8-rock stock. In all three these cases 
misrecognition spells loss and potential destruction. 
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CHAPTER 6. IDENTITY, INFINITY, RESPONSIBILITY, TOTALITY 
The theme of identity - as discovering its responsibility in the face of the other’s 
infinity is clearly portrayed in the character of Deek Morgan. His life also exemplifies the 
contradiction inherent in the Oven’s symbols, which by its words promote totalizing others 
and yet by its symbolic value promotes the protection of women. This section thus ties 
together the arguments of this thesis in the character of Deek. 
In his article “Furrowing All the Brows: Interpretation and the Transcendent in Toni 
Morrison’s Paradise,” Page argues that Deek’s life reflects the potentially positive changes 
for the town (645). Deek’s confusion about his relationship with Steward indicates his need 
to grow on his own beyond this bond with his brother. For Page, this symbolizes the town’s 
need to grow beyond its confining bond with its own legend and thus to move from “a 
restrictive fusion to a liberating fragmentation”  (645). On an individual level, the hitherto 
completeness of the Morgan twin’s relationship is suggestive that the self’s identity in 
relation to other people is complete as a “you and me.” On a social level, the Morgan twin’s 
relationship implies that Ruby had been in relationship with itself only, but after the break 
caused by the Convent attack Ruby stood a chance to grow beyond the bond with itself and 
thus become accepting of other societies. Deek forms a bond with someone other than his 
own twin when he reaches out to the other in the person of Reverend Misner. Similarly the 
attack on the Convent reveals to the people of Ruby that their views about the other is 
dangerous and needs revision. The younger generation now has reason to justify their need 
and Ruby’s need to get involved in the greater affairs of life that involve other people. 
On a more personal level, Morrison portrays through Deek’s experiences that 
confronting the effects of totalizing the other can bring the self face to face with itself. When 
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after the attack on the Convent the men are asked: “What manner of evil is in you?” Steward 
replies: “The evil is in this house” (291). Instead of justifying his crime, Deek on the other 
hand takes responsibility for it. Deek responds: “My brother is lying. This is our doing. Ours 
alone. And we bear the responsibility” (291). Morrison evaluates this moment when she 
writes, “It was Deacon Morgan who had changed the most. It was as though he had looked in 
his brother’s face and did not like himself anymore” (300). Later Deek tells Reverend Misner 
about his grandfather Zechariah who split up from his twin brother, because he saw the way 
his brother thought about things when hard pressed. Deek believes what his grandfather saw 
in his brother scared and shamed him, because the shame was in himself (303). Similarly 
Deek saw that he too, like Steward, was capable of answering, “The evil is in this house” and 
it shamed him to realize that that is the kind of man he was. It was as if he saw himself in a 
mirror reflection.  
When Deek’s grandfather thus “disallowed” his brother by never speaking to him 
again or inviting him to trek West, he had in effect totalized him, having reduced him to that 
one characteristic that saw him fold under pressure. And in rejecting that characteristic – 
which he recognized as potentially his own – he was distancing himself from a part of 
himself that he wished to deny. Similarly the Ruby men scapegoat the Convent women in 
order to deal with flaws within themselves. In the same way, by destroying the Convent 
women, Deek thought he would destroy his own shame over his affair with Connie. 
 Yet, in a moment of truth, looking at Connie just before Steward shot her, Deek had 
a glimpse of infinity, which he cannot deny nor forget. In that moment he “sees in her eyes 
what has been drained from them and from himself as well” (289), and what he saw “made 
the sun look like a fool” (301). For an instant it was clear that she could reveal another realm 
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to him. He realizes there are things indescribable and uncontainable about her and that 
having reduced her to an object of blame he has missed out on the uniqueness of her person 
and he sees how much she deserved not to be killed – but rather protected. His attempt to 
protect her at this moment failed, but this revelation changed him fundamentally (289). 
Deek acknowledges that he had become “what the Old Fathers cursed: the kind of 
man who set himself up to judge, rout and even destroy the needy, the defenseless, the 
different” (302). The burden of not being a protector but a destroyer makes his life 
“uninhabitable” (302). It is however only by his confrontation with the infinite about Connie 
that he discovered his true identity. In Steward’s attitude to the attack Deek recognizes his 
old self, for it is a new Deek who can see that a man destroying the defenseless is not who he 
wants to be. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has put Lacan, Levinas, and Morrison in conversation. Each of the three 
writers argues from a different perspective. All three, however, acknowledge and probe the 
idea of the other as infinite, inexhaustible, uncontainable –yet, as part of the self’s identity. 
Viewing otherness as such inevitably confronts one with the ethics of how to deal with that 
which cannot be reduced to containable knowledge. Whereas the works of Lacan and 
Levinas are generally inaccessible to readers outside of theory, Morrison’s novels are 
accessible to a wider audience and thus enable the dissemination of values all three authors 
promote.  
Paradise cannot be summarized as a novel that merely warns against intolerance. It 
also goes beyond the argument to re-imagine more inclusive, accepting communities that 
disrupt the exclusion of others (Romero 415). It is in fact arguing that the self is the twin of 
the other person. Grasping this truth will hopefully lead to social relations of tolerance for 
difference in all walks of life.  
An analysis of a novel by an African American that teems with doubleness as it 
explores identity is incomplete without exploring the impact of W.E.B Du Bois’s work on 
double-consciousness in relation to such a novel. My neglect to venture into such an 
exploration is not due to an oversight, but to the constraints of this thesis. The fruitfulness of 
such a study is inevitable and therefore highly recommended. 
Future studies would furthermore benefit greatly by venturing into Levinas’s theory 
on the ethics of responsibility, understanding Lacan’s notion of the Real and its influence in 
human behavior, and analyzing the in-between spaces and various dynamics involved in the 
healing and nurturing of the Convent women. Such studies would certainly strengthen the 
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argument Morrison is making for readers to join her in shouldering the work toward avoiding 
war and instead enabling human-to-human relations of inclusion.  
In this thesis I have analyzed portrayals of identity as it is informed by relationships 
of the self and the other. I have used the work of Lacan to point out how Morrison depicts the 
other mirrored in the self and I have used Levinas’s notions of totality and infinity to 
highlight Morrison’s illustrations of the self mirrored in the other – as when the self views 
the other through the self’s self-conception or worldview. As mentioned at the outset of this 
thesis, Morrison’s work is always political. She does not aim to entertain. Her works are 
meant to impact human consciousness and affect change. Her works do not advocate specific 
courses of action, just as Levinas’s ethics are not of prescriptive rules. Morrison sketches an 
image of the self to the self and leaves the self with the choice of what to do with the self-
revelation held up in Paradise. Each reader is left with the response-ability to either neglect 
or take up the responsibility of viewing the other as a reflection of him or herself. Each 
group, affected by such an understanding, is similarly left with the same responsibility of 
choice. 
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